Do Trade Costs in Goods Market Lead to Home Bias in Equities? by Coeurdacier, Nicolas
DO TRADE COSTS IN GOODS MARKET
































































centre de recherche / RESEARCH CENTER
AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH
BP 50105 CERGY
95021 CERGY PONTOISE CEDEX
FRANCE
TéL. 33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
FAX 33 (0)1 34 43 30 01
research.center@essec.fr
essec business school.
établissements privés d’enseignement supérieur,
association loi 1901,
accréditéS aacsb international - the association 
TO ADVANCE COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, 
accrédités EQUIS - the european quality improvement system,
affiliés à la chambre de commerce et d’industrie
de versailles val d’oise - yvelines.
Pour tous renseignements :
• Centre de Recherche/Research Center
Tél. 33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
research.center@essec.fr
• Visitez notre site
www.essec.frDo Trade Costs in Goods Market Lead  









Two of the main puzzles in international economics are the consumption and the portfolio 
home biases. They are empirically related: countries that are more open to trade also have 
more internationally diversified portfolios. In a two-country stochastic equilibrium model, I 
prove that introducing trade costs in goods market alone, as suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
[2000], is not sufficient to explain these two puzzles simultaneously. On the contrary, for 
reasonable parameter values, trade costs create a foreign bias in portfolios. To reconcile facts 
and theory, I introduce a combination of small frictions in financial markets and trade costs in 
goods market. The interaction between the two types of frictions determines optimal portfolio 
allocation. When trade costs increase, competition in the goods market softens and the 
volatility of domestic income falls. Facing lower risk, investors have less incentive to pay the 
financial transaction cost and increase their holdings of domestic assets. The model correctly 
predicts that the larger the home bias in consumption, the larger the home bias in portfolios. 
 
 





Les consommations sont fortement biaisées vers des biens produits localement. De même, les 
portefeuilles sont fortement biaisés vers des actifs domestiques. Empiriquement, ces deux 
biais sont liés : les pays les plus ouverts au commerce de biens ont des portefeuilles mieux 
diversifiés internationalement. Dans un modèle d’équilibre général stochastique à deux pays,  
nous montrons que, contrairement aux suggestions d’Obstfeld et Rogoff (2000), les coûts au 
commerce seuls ne peuvent expliquer ces faits stylisés. Par contre, nous montrons qu’en 
présence de faibles coûts de transaction sur les marchés financiers internationaux et de coûts 
importants au commerce, nous pouvons réconcilier la théorie et les faits. Le mécanisme est le 
suivant : lorsque les coûts au commerce diminuent, la compétition sur le marché des produits 
devient plus intense, les parts de marché des firmes et les profits associés sont plus volatiles. 
Du fait de cette augmentation de l’incertitude, les investisseurs sont plus incités à payer les 
coûts de transaction sur les marchés financiers pour se diversifier internationalement.  
 
 
Mots-clés: Biais domestique, Choix de portefeuille, Coûts au commerce, Macroéconomie 
internationale 
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Abstract
Two of the main puzzles in international economics are the consumption and the portfolio home
biases. They are empirically related: countries that are more open to trade also have more interna-
tionally diversi¯ed portfolios. In a two-country stochastic equilibrium model, I prove that introducing
trade costs in goods market alone, as suggested by Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000], is not su±cient to
explain these two puzzles simultaneously. On the contrary, for reasonable parameter values, trade
costs create a foreign bias in portfolios. To reconcile facts and theory, I introduce a combination of
small frictions in ¯nancial markets and trade costs in goods market. The interaction between the two
types of frictions determines optimal portfolio allocation. When trade costs increase, competition in
the goods market softens and the volatility of domestic income falls. Facing lower risk, investors have
less incentive to pay the ¯nancial transaction cost and increase their holdings of domestic assets. The
model correctly predicts that the larger the home bias in consumption, the larger the home bias in
portfolios.
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11 Introduction
This paper is mainly motivated by three stylized facts:
1. People mainly consume domestically produced goods: the \home bias in consumption puzzle"
2. People hold a disproportionate share of domestic assets : the \home bias in portfolios puzzle"
3. International trade in goods and international trade in assets are positively related.
The ¯rst fact is well known: looking at consumption baskets, countries are not very open to trade. For
instance, the openness to trade ratio in the US measured by the sum of exports and imports over GDP is
only 24% in 2004. Given that the US account for about a third of world production, they should import
about two thirds of their GDP in the absence of frictions in goods markets. Then, the openness ratio
should be higher than 120%! Without being so ambitious about market integration, even the US and
Canada are far from being perfectly integrated (Mac Callum [1995]
1).
The second fact is also well known: since the seminal paper of French and Poterba [1991], the \home
bias in equities" is one of the most pervasive empirical observations in international economics. Although
home bias could be mainly due to capital market segmentation in the eighties, this explanation might
be less valid nowadays. Indeed, developed countries opened up their stock market to foreign investors
in the eighties, followed by many emerging economies in the early nineties, leading to a large increase
in cross-border asset trade (Lane and Milesi-Feretti [2003]). However, the home bias in equities has not
decreased sizeably. In 2000, US investors still hold 85% percent of domestic equities and the \home bias
in equities" is observed in all developed countries (Chan et al. [2004]).
The third fact is less known but there is now massive evidence that countries which are more open to
trade are also more ¯nancially open. In other words, everything else equal, countries with higher import
(or export) shares have larger stocks of foreign assets. Lane [2000], Aizenman [2004], Aizenman and Noy
[2004], Heathcote and Perri [2004] show this result using panel data for a cross-section of countries (see
also ¯gure 4 in appendix). Looking at bilateral data on trade in goods and asset holdings, Portes and Rey
[2005], Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004] and Lane and Milesi-Feretti [2004] show that country portfolios are
strongly biased towards trading partners. Moreover, Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004] show that the causality
goes essentially in one direction: reducing trade barriers between countries enhances cross-border asset
holdings.
There is now quite a consensus that international trade costs understood in a broad sense (i.e transport
costs, tari®s, \border e®ect"...) can explain the ¯rst fact. Indeed, as shown by Anderson and Van Wincoop
[2004], international trade costs are very large, as large as production costs for some products. But what
1see also Anderson and Van Wincoop [2003] who correct Mac Callum estimates controlling for multilateral resistance.
2about facts 2 and 3? Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000] argue that \home bias in equities" might also be due to
frictions in international goods markets rather than frictions in ¯nancial markets. If this is true, then the
third fact becomes obvious and one can replicate these three features of international markets with only
one simple friction, namely trade costs.
The objective of this paper is twofold:
- First, I ask whether the Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000] argument is valid, i.e whether trade costs in
goods markets alone can generate substantial \home bias" in portfolios. Contrary to their ¯ndings, I
¯nd that in general trade costs actually worsen the \home bias in portfolios puzzle". Trade costs help to
solve the \home bias in consumption puzzle" but at the expense of facts 2 and 3.
- Second, given the inability of the model to replicate these three broad facts with trade costs alone,
I rather propose a combination of small ¯nancial frictions in investing abroad and high trade costs in
goods market to reconcile facts and theory. That frictions in ¯nancial markets will help to solve the
\home bias in portfolios puzzle" is a tautology but that is not the whole story. The interaction between
frictions in goods markets and frictions in ¯nancial markets also matters for portfolio choice. The reason
is the following: reducing trade costs increases international competition in goods markets, making ¯rms'
revenues more volatile. As a consequence, needs for diversi¯cation increase and people will more likely
buy foreign assets for a given level of frictions in ¯nancial markets. With ¯nancial frictions, introducing
trade costs helps to replicate fact 1 but no more at the expense of facts 2 and 3.
Returning to my ¯rst point, let us see why, under complete markets, trade costs in goods markets
alone are in general not su±cient to generate some \home bias in equities". Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000]
develop a static two-country general equilibrium model with complete markets and trade costs. Due
to trade costs, domestic investors might be reluctant to hold foreign assets since consumption is biased
towards home goods and so are holdings of Arrow-Debreu securities that ¯nance these consumption
patterns. However, as they point out, they do not provide in the general case the portfolios of tradable
assets consistent with this complete markets allocation. I propose here to ¯ll this gap and to ¯nd equity
portfolios that replicate the optimal consumption allocation. I will show that the bias towards domestic
equities is far from being systematic.
In a fully symmetric model with two countries, fully integrated capital and goods markets, represen-
tative agents in each country would hold a perfectly diversi¯ed portfolio, i.e the world market portfolio
that contains half of domestic assets and half of foreign assets
2. But in the presence of trade costs, do-
mestic and foreign investors face di®erent aggregate price indices and will hold di®erent equity portfolios
to insure against real exchange rate °uctuations. This result is not new since Adler and Dumas [1983]
show in partial equilibrium how deviations from \purchasing power parity" due to real exchange rate
2This result holds if we abstract from labour revenues or equivalently labour revenues and asset returns were uncorrelated
which would suppress any \hedging demand".
3°uctuations might lead to portfolios that deviate from the world market portfolio. In particular, agents
who are more risk averse than logarithmic investors will bias their portfolios towards assets that pay more
when the domestic aggregate price is higher, i.e when the real exchange rate appreciates, in order to
stabilize their purchasing power (and inversely, agents who are less risk averse than logarithmic investors
will prefer assets that pay more when prices are low). In other words, for su±ciently risk averse investors,
the \revenue e®ect" dominates the \substitution e®ect" and these investors want more revenues in the
states of nature where their price index is higher: consequently, they purchase assets that give higher
returns when the real exchange rate appreciates. The same sort of mechanism is at work here but the
model goes one step further since the general equilibrium approach allows to analyze whether domestic
asset returns should be (or not) positively correlated with the real exchange rate under various types of
frictions in goods markets.
In the presence of trade costs, the key point for portfolio allocation is whether the domestic capital
returns (relative to the foreign ones) and the real exchange rate are positively or negatively correlated:
a positive correlation meaning a \home bias in portfolio" when agents are more risk averse than log-
investors. I show that this correlation is clearly a®ected by the size of trade costs. However, for trade
costs consistent with international consumption patterns, the model predict that this correlation should
be negative. Optimal portfolios should exhibit a foreign bias! Indeed, in periods of domestic recession
(due to a lower productivity), domestic ¯rms have lower capital returns while foreign ¯rms expand their
market share, giving higher returns. This decrease in production in the home country leads to an increase
of the relative price of home goods to clear the goods market: the real exchange rate appreciates. Poor
performance in the home country is then associated with higher domestic prices. That is why, domestic
consumers would be better insured against relative price movements by holding a larger share of foreign
assets ex-ante. The bottom-line is that in standard cases, trade costs alone cannot generate any \home
bias in equities" and the puzzle is even worsened.
I now come to my second point. Given that the model with trade costs alone generates some \home
bias in consumption" at the expense of \foreign bias in equities", it seems reasonable to assume that
some small frictions in ¯nancial markets remain. Frictions in ¯nancial markets are introduced in a simple
way: for each share of foreign asset bought, domestic agents must pay a constant tax rate on foreign
dividends distributed
3. This asset trade cost captures any frictions in ¯nancial markets (transaction
costs, informational costs, \familiarity e®ects", higher taxes paid on foreign dividends...). The existence
of informational asymmetries or \familiarity e®ects" in ¯nancial markets is the main message of Coval
and Moskowitz [1999], Portes and Rey [2005] and Huberman [2001] to explain international equity trade.
Looking at international taxation of capital incomes, Gordon and Hines [2002] ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences
3These taxes on foreign dividends are redistributed to domestic residents such that nothing is lost.
4of ¯scal treatment between investment in domestic assets and investment in foreign assets. Adding
frictions in ¯nancial markets will generate some \home bias in portfolio" but the theoretical point I want
to make clear is that the interaction between both types of frictions is also relevant for portfolio choice. I
show that lowering trade costs in goods markets increases the diversi¯cation bene¯ts and enhances asset
trade, which might reduce the home bias in portfolio for a given level of ¯nancial frictions (consistently
with fact 3). Why does goods market integration increase the need for diversi¯cation? The reason is that
a reduction in trade costs increases international competition and then increases the volatility of capital
returns. Indeed, international competition ampli¯es the e®ect of a good productivity shock. Suppose that
domestic ¯rms are hit by a good productivity shock. At given factor costs, they will expand their market
shares due to higher competitiveness on foreign markets, which raises pro¯ts and capital returns. When
foreign ¯rms are not sheltered from international competition (low level of trade costs), the gain in market
shares of domestic ¯rms is much higher, amplifying the impact of a good productivity shock on capital
returns. Moreover, the increase in domestic ¯rms capital returns is at the expense of foreign ¯rms, which
tends to make the two assets less substitutable. This also increases the diversi¯cation bene¯ts o®ered
by foreign assets. The evidence that increasing competition from foreign markets make ¯rms cash-°ows
more volatile is scarce but consistent with Thesmar and Thoenig [2004] and Irvine and Ponti® [2005] at
the ¯rm level and di Giovanni and Levchenko [2006] at the sectoral-level. Easterly et al. [2000] and Kose
et al. [2003] show that trade openness increases volatility of growth at the macro-level.
Of course, real exchange rate hedging motives are still present and play in the opposite direction for
portfolio composition, generating some foreign bias in portfolios. The impact of trade costs in goods
markets on domestic asset holdings is then ambiguous, depending on the relative strength of these two
forces: diversi¯cation bene¯ts versus hedging real exchange rate °uctuations. I show that under realistic
calibrations, decreasing trade costs in goods markets raises holdings of foreign assets. This is more
consistent with observed portfolio allocations. Finally, I shall insist on the fact that reasonably low
frictions between ¯nancial markets can generate very large biases in portfolios. Indeed, an increase
in domestic production leads to a fall in the relative price of domestic goods and this terms-of-trade
movement provides a good insurance mechanism to both investors (like in Cole and Obstfeld [1991],
Acemoglu and Ventura [2002] and Pavlova and Rigobon [2003]), reducing the needs for diversi¯cation.
This paper is related to the \New Open Economy Macroeconomics" literature. Since the Obstfeld and
Rogo® Redux model [1995], this literature has brought many theoretical works to build a new workhorse
model for open-economy analysis (see Lane [2003] for a survey). Those models typically rely on imperfect
competition in product markets. Firms engage in monopolistic competition, which leads to operating
pro¯ts that are redistributed to shareholders. In a globalized world, shareholders could likely be foreign
ones, however very little attention has been brought on this aspect and these models assume that pro¯ts
5of domestic ¯rms are redistributed to domestic residents. Given the size of the \home bias", this could
be seen as a realistic assumption, but one could argue that home bias in equities should be an outcome
of the model rather than an assumption. The model is an attempt to endogeneize portfolio choice
in a two-country model with monopolistic competition. Engel and Matsumoto [2004] also determines
optimal portfolios endogenously: in their set-up, consumers hold a disproportionate part of domestic
assets because of the negative correlation between labour incomes and domestic asset returns in presence
of price rigidities (see also Gali [1999]). Due to price stickiness, a good productivity shock leads a ¯rm
that cannot readjust prices to reduce its labour demand, reducing consequently labour revenues. Since
domestic workers want to hedge their risky labour incomes, they would rather hold domestic assets. I
investigate a di®erent source of heterogeneity among investors that could potentially lead to home bias
in equities, namely the presence of frictions in international goods markets. A paper that is close to this
approach is Uppal [1993]: he develops a dynamic general equilibrium of two endowment economies with
complete markets and trade costs and ¯nd optimal international portfolio choice. However, he restricts
its attention to the case of perfect substitutability between home and foreign goods. I will show that
this last assumption plays a crucial role even in the absence of ¯nancial frictions and relaxing it leads
to a richer and more complex portfolio allocation. Kollmann [2006] solves numerically for international
portfolios in a dynamic general equilibrium of two endowment economies but without trade costs neither
in goods nor in ¯nancial markets. Instead, he restricts its attention to the case of home bias in preferences
and complete ¯nancial markets. Heathcote and Perri [2004] solve for optimal portfolios in a model with
production where ¯rms have a bias towards home goods as production inputs, but without trade costs
whatsoever
4. A related literature is also Dellas and Stockman [1989], Baxter et al. [1998], Serrat [2001]
and Pesenti and Van Wincoop [2002] who consider the presence of non-traded goods as a source of equity
home bias. My approach is quite di®erent since I look at continuous measures of frictions in goods markets
rather than a dichotomy between tradables and non-tradables. More essentially, to my knowledge, no
one has emphasized how the interaction between trade costs and ¯nancial frictions determines optimal
portfolio allocation.
In section 2, I derive and describe the symmetric two-country equilibrium under complete markets.
I give the exact conditions under which trade costs lead to home bias in equities and show that these
conditions are violated under reasonable preference parameters. Section 3 then adds frictions in ¯nancial
markets. I show that the interaction of small frictions in ¯nancial markets and large trade costs matters
for portfolio choice and that, contrary to the previous section, increasing trade costs in this case helps to
solve the \home bias in equities puzzle". Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
4Moreover since consumers have log-utility, this rules out any hedging of the real exchange rate.
62 The model under complete markets
2.1 Set-up
The world economy consists in two symmetric countries, home and foreign. Home variables are denoted
with (H), foreign variables with (F).
There is one representative agent in each country endowed with the same quantity of capital in the
initial period to preserve symmetry.
The timing of the model is the following:
- In period 0, agents in both countries invest their initial endowment in domestic or foreign ¯rms
(portfolio choice). A risk-free bond exists but due to symmetry of countries, there is no bond-holding in
equilibrium.
- In period 1, shocks to productivity are realized and ¯rms produce. Production in both countries uses
capital according to a constant returns to scale production function
5. Domestic and foreign goods are
imperfect substitutes (each ¯rm in each country is producing one variety) and ¯rms are setting prices in
a standard monopolistic competition set-up µ a la Dixit-Stiglitz [1977]. In both countries, agents consume
using their revenues from the dividend streams (part of ¯rms pro¯ts and capital returns) of their assets.
They face trade costs when they import goods from the other country.
The uncertainty is de¯ned in the following way: productivity in each country is stochastic and country-
speci¯c, which means that an increase in productivity a®ects symmetrically each ¯rm in the country. This
reduces the dimension of the uncertainty to the number of countries. Since the uncertainty is country
speci¯c, domestic ¯rms have perfectly correlated capital returns and the portfolio choice is made between
two di®erent assets (domestic and foreign). Moreover, the uncertainty is bi-dimensional and agents will
replicate the complete markets allocation simply by trading domestic and foreign equity shares
6.
2.2 Consumer preferences







where Ci is the aggregate consumption rate in country i, ° is the coe±cient of relative risk-aversion.
In both countries, the representative agent consumes a basket of di®erentiated goods. Goods produced
in each country are de¯ned over a continuum of mass 1.
5In an earlier version of the paper, I added labour inputs in the production: adding labour does not modify any of the
result with respect to the presence of trade costs. However in a world where ¯rms revenues are split between capital and
labour incomes, workers-investors have an incentive to short domestic stocks since their wages are over-exposed to domestic
risks (see Baxter and Jermann [1995]).
6To be precise, markets are complete at the ¯rst-order, the degree of the linear approximation. Note also that adding
industry-speci¯c shocks within a country would not change our results since these shocks would be perfectly hedged with
well diversi¯ed portfolio of the di®erent domestic industries.



























j (v) is the consumption of variety (v) from country j by a representative agent in country
(H) and ® ¸
1
2 is a parameter of bias in preferences towards domestic goods. The parameter ® can be
seen as some distrust by domestic consumers with respect to foreign products. It can also be shown that
® is homogenous to a restriction in the number of foreign varieties e®ectively traded (Bergin, Glick and
Taylor [2005]). This allow us to analyze whether trade impediments have di®erent e®ects on consumption
and portfolios patterns when they a®ect the extensive margin (lower number of varieties traded) or the




1¡½ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. We will assume that this
elasticity is strictly larger than one
8.


























In country (j), ¯rms produce the ¯nal good (v) under monopolistic competition using a technology with
constant returns to scale relative to capital:
yj(v) = ajkj(v)
where aj is the stochastic productivity in country j. This is the only source of uncertainty in the
model.
Given factor costs, the marginal-cost of producing one unit of good (v) in country (j) is equal to
cj =
rj
aj where rj is the cost of capital.
² Price-setting
As is well known, in such a set-up each ¯rm faces a demand with a constant elasticity (1 ¡ ½)
¡1 > 1.







Since pj(v) is independent of the variety (and just country-speci¯c), I will abstract from subscripts (v)
from now on.
7Actually, it will yield di®erent predictions only if home and foreign goods are very poor substitutes, a calibration that
I do not consider as realistic. See discussion in 2.9.
8Following Tille [2001], one could assume that the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is di®erent
from the elasticity of substitution between varieties of a country (due to specialization of countries in particular sectors).
This does not change the message of the paper unless home and foreign goods are very poor substitutes. See discussion in
2.9.
8² Capital incomes
In this set-up, pro¯ts and factor payments are simply a constant fraction of total sales.
¼j = (1 ¡ ½)pjyj
rjkj = ½pjyj
Pro¯ts are fully redistributed to shareholders. I introduce Rjkj = rjkj +¼j = pjyj, the aggregate capital
revenues in country (j) which are simply equal to total sales.
2.4 Trade Costs
In addition to the home bias in preferences, exports from country j to country i are subject to some
exogenous trade costs ¿ (of iceberg-type) such that the price faced by consumers in country i over goods
from country j is for i 6= j:
p
i
j = (1 + ¿)pj
This features frictions in international goods markets such as transport costs or other barriers to inter-
national trade (trade policies, \border e®ect"...). Trade costs and home bias in preferences are the only
sources of heterogeneity among investors in this part and consequently the only reason why they might
hold di®erent portfolios in equilibrium.
To solve this model for consumption and optimal portfolio allocation, I will proceed in two-steps.
First, I solve for optimal consumption allocation by considering the goods market equilibrium. Second,
I will give the optimal portfolios that support this consumption allocation.
2.5 Consumer maximization





















subject to a budget constraint:
pHc
H
H + (1 + ¿)pFc
H
F · IH (¸H)
PHCH · IH (¸H)
where IH are total incomes of the representative agent in country (H), ¸H is the Lagrange-Multiplier










price index of agent (H). IH depends on the claims of the representative agent over ¯rms capital returns.
At this point, I take portfolios chosen in period 0 as given.
























Symmetry in preferences and trade costs yields the symmetric expressions for consumption allocation
in country (F).
2.6 Aggregate demand
Aggregate demands over home and foreign goods are:
DH = c
H














































1¡½ is assumed to be larger than one, » 2 [0;1] and is
inversely related to trade costs and to the home bias in preferences.


































2.7 Log-linearization around the symmetric equilibrium







I consider approximation around the symmetric equilibrium where both countries have the same
productivity a





I denote with (^) the deviations of the variables from the symmetric equilibrium:
b u = log(
u
u¤) where u
¤ is the value at the symmetric equilibrium.
In particular, b ai = log(
ai
a¤) is the deviation of productivity from the symmetric equilibrium in country
(i). Productivity shocks (
ai
a¤) are assumed to be log-normally distributed and so will be all variables (
u
u¤).
Note also that given that capital is ¯xed, b ai = b yi = c Di.
102.7.1 Relative demand function



















































2 [0;1]. µ½ is a monotonic transformation of barriers to trade in goods:
µ½ is increasing in ¿ (and in ®). When µ½ is close to zero, barriers to trade in goods are very low whereas
when µ½ is close to one, both markets are almost segmented (for instance when trade costs are in¯nite).
As a consequence, we will see µ½ as a measure of trade trade barriers. Actually one can easily show that
in equilibrium, (1¡µ½) is equal to the openness to trade ratio de¯ned as the sum of exports plus imports
over GDP.






































°] and b ¸i = ¡ d PiC
°
i is the Lagrange-multiplier of the budget constraint
for country (i).
The ¯rst term (¡Ãc pH
pF ) is the market share e®ect. This term measures how a fall in the relative
price of home goods (terms-of-trade
pH
pF ) makes agents increase their relative demand for home goods.





pF ) is due to the
intratemporal substitution across goods. A fall in the relative price of home goods make both agents
switch their consumption towards these goods. This e®ect is dampened by trade costs since trade costs
shelter foreign ¯rms from domestic competition and then domestic ¯rms expand less their market share
after a reduction in production costs





pF ) is due to the substitution across states
of natures at the aggregate level. A fall in the price of home goods lowers the price index of domestic
agents, which increases their aggregate consumption. Since their consumption falls primarily on domestic
goods, this stimulates aggregate demand for these goods (all the more that trade frictions are important).
9Note that given the numeraire used: b P = 1
2

b PH + b PF

= 1
2 (c pH + c pF) = 0
10Note that without trade frictions (¿ = 0 and ® = 1
2), Ã = 1
1¡½ which is the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods.




¸F ) is a relative demand shock due to ¯nancial markets incompleteness. When
markets are complete (and asset portfolios are optimal), ¸H = ¸F and this term cancels out (which will
be the case in this section). When markets are incomplete, a shock that increases revenues in country
H, increases relative demand for goods in country H due to trade costs or home bias in preferences
(note that indeed this terms disappears when µ½ = 0: when there are neither frictions nor home bias in
preferences, demand shocks a®ect both goods symmetrically).
For this part, I consider that markets are complete. I will relax this assumption by introducing costs
of holding foreign securities in the next section.
2.7.2 Relative capital returns
Since shocks are country-speci¯c and ¯rms in country (j) fully symmetric, I can restrict my attention to
aggregate capital returns in country (j):
Rjkj = pjyj = pjDj (due to market-clearing).


























Equation (5) is a \key equation" : it tells us about the co-movements of relative prices with relative
returns to capital. Indeed, the sign of the covariance of these two variables will be key to determine the
direction portfolio biases.
The key point is whether Ã < 1 or Ã > 1, which means whether capital returns relative to foreign
ones are higher when the price of home goods is higher or the other way around. Indeed, higher prices
of home goods increase home returns (price e®ect) but at the expense of lower demand (market share
e®ect). In standard cases, the market share e®ect will dominate (Ã > 1) but it is not necessarily the case.
In particular, it depends on the intensity of trade frictions.
When ¿ is high enough (µ
2






: this means that under the realistic assumption
(° > 1), we have (1 ¡ Ã) > 0, and higher prices in the home country (better terms-of-trade) are associated
with higher relative capital returns in the home country. In particular, when productivity is high in the
home country, prices are lower and home returns shrink relative to foreign ones since productivity is
higher for all competitors in the home market and this price decrease is not associated with higher
market share on foreign markets
11. When trade costs are high, foreign markets are sheltered from the
competition from domestic ¯rms and domestic ¯rms cannot really expand their market share following a
11For domestic investors, capital returns might well be higher in real terms since domestic prices are lower but assets do
not pay in real terms.
12fall in production costs. Although possible, this is a rather non-standard case since it means that a rise
in domestic production essentially bene¯ts to foreigners through the fall of the terms-of trade.
When barriers to trade in goods are low (µ
2
½ ! 0), 1 ¡ Ã ¼ ¡
½
1¡½ < 0
12: higher prices in the home
country are now associated with lower returns in the home country. This is due to the gain in market
shares: when prices are low, domestic ¯rms have a larger foreign demand and this dominates the fall in
price due to competition in the home market. Domestic capital returns increase relative to foreign ones
after a fall in the relative price of home goods. Contrary to the previous case, the fall in the terms-of-trade
does not out outweigh the gain of the expansion.
One can show easily that there exist a unique µ
¤










When µ½ > µ
¤
½ (high level of trade costs), the price e®ect dominates the market share e®ect. Relative
prices of home goods and relative home capital returns are positively correlated in this case. This is the
other way around when µ½ < µ
¤
½. For reasonable trade costs, the gain in market shares dominates the fall
in the relative price and home capital returns (relative to foreign ones) are higher when the relative price
of home goods is lower.
When µ½ = µ
¤
½, d RH = c RF and returns are perfectly correlated making home and foreign assets perfect
substitutes. The price e®ect and the market share e®ect exactly compensate each other. Portfolios will










as goods become closer substitutes, competition in international markets is tougher and a small decrease
in domestic prices increases a lot the demand for home goods. The \expenditure switching e®ect" is
getting stronger and trade barriers must be very large to shelter foreign ¯rms from the competition of
home ¯rms.






when ° is increasing, the additional aggregate domestic demand which falls primarily on domestic goods
when prices are low is rather small (given that under complete markets c CH = ¡
1
° c PH). Then, a decrease
12We have assumed that the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties ( 1
1¡½) is larger than 1 (or
½ > 0). See discussion in 2.9 for the case where 1
1¡½ < 1.
13in the price of home goods generates higher cash-°ows of domestic ¯rms if they can easily increase their
market share (i.e trade costs must not be too large).
2.7.3 The real exchange rate




An increase in RER is an appreciation of the home real exchange rate.








Due to trade costs, an increase in domestic prices appreciates the real exchange rate. In the absence of
trade costs and home bias in preferences (µ½ = 0), the real exchange rate is constant since both countries
consume the same basket of goods. µ½ is a measure of trade barriers but it is also the elasticity of the real
exchange rate with respect to the terms-of trade: it measures how the price of the consumption bundle
of an investor depends on the price of locally produced goods.
In presence of trade barriers, an increase in the relative price of domestic goods is equivalent to a real
exchange rate appreciation. This is consistent with a positive correlation between the terms-of-trade and
the real exchange rate observed in industrialized countries (see Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000]).
Therefore, the real exchange rate and relative capital returns are negatively correlated when µ½ < µ
¤
½
and positively correlated when µ½ > µ
¤
½ (high level of trade costs).
2.8 Portfolio choice
The number of shares in each country is normalized to one. I introduce ¹ the number of domestic shares
held by domestic investors before the realization of shocks. Due to symmetry and to market-clearing in
the asset market, (1 ¡ ¹) is the number of foreign shares held by a domestic investor. The domestic




s:t : PHCH = ¹RHk + (1 ¡ ¹)RFk
Instead of solving the maximization, I use the symmetry assumption to ¯nd equilibrium portfolios
that support the consumption allocation found in the previous section. This method is tricky but one
can look at the appendix for the same derivation using investors maximization.
Since markets are complete, the ratio of marginal utilities over consumption for both agents equalizes








c CH ¡ c CF
´
= c PF ¡ c PH
Using symmetry, log-linearisation of the budget-constraints in both countries gives:
c PH + c CH =
³
¹d RH + (1 ¡ ¹) c RF
´
c PF + c CF =
³
¹c RF + (1 ¡ ¹)d RH
´
Rearranging terms to express the real exchange rate in terms of relative capital returns leads to:
³





) = (2¹ ¡ 1)(d RH ¡ c RF)
Taking covariances of the previous expression with c pH




)cov(c PH ¡ c PF;
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Then, as long as Ã 6= 1(in this speci¯c case, foreign and domestic assets are perfect substitutes and
portfolios are undetermined































Shareholdings of domestic equity depend on two terms:
- the market portfolio (which is
1
2) due to diversi¯cation motive


























We get a standard result: a logarithmic investor (° = 1) is not a®ected by °uctuations in the real
exchange rate and the \hedging" term disappears in this case. Of course, in absence of trade costs and
home bias in preferences (µ½ = 0), the real exchange rate is constant and the \hedging" term also cancels
out. If ° > 1, this term is negative when µ½ < µ
¤
½ or equivalently Ã > 1 (resp. positive for µ½ > µ
¤
½):
indeed, for a reasonable level of trade costs (µ½ < µ
¤
½), domestic returns are higher than foreign ones when
the real exchange rate depreciates. As a consequence, domestic investors prefer foreign assets since they
give higher returns when the domestic price index is higher. In other words, when the relative price of









= 0 or equivalently µ½ = µ¤
½. A good productivity shock is exactly o®set by
a fall in the relative price.
15home goods increase, foreign ¯rms expand their market shares, which increases foreign asset returns. In
these states of nature, the home investor needs more revenues to reach a given level of consumption.
That is why he mainly purchases foreign assets ex-ante.
² Benchmark Calibration:
Calibration of the parameters is presented in table 1.
Preferences





Home-bias in preferences ® = 0:7 (or 0:5)
Trade costs ¿ 2 [0;1]
Table 1: Parameters values
Comments on the calibration:
I set the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties to 5. Estimates of this elasticity
vary a lot across studies. Estimates from micro (sectoral) data in international trade usually ¯nd much
higher elasticities, ranging from 4 to 15. For instance, using data on OECD countries at the 3-Digit level,
Harrigan [1993] ¯nd elasticities in the range of 5 to 12. Hummels [2001] estimates an average elasticity
at the 2-digit level of 5.6. Baier and Bergstrand [2001] reports an estimate of 6.4 using aggregate trade
°ows between OECD countries. However, estimates from time-series macro data in the RBC literature
usually give much lower elasticities, ranging from 1 to 3 (Backus et al. [1994]). In line with Obstfeld and
Rogo® [2000], I choose the lower bound of estimates from the trade literature. Anyway, as long as the
elasticity is larger than 1, qualitative results for this section remain unchanged.
When the elasticity of substitution is larger than one, trade costs and home bias in preferences have
qualitatively the same impact on consumption and portfolios. To have reasonable trade costs for an
elasticity of substitution of ¯ve, I must set the home-bias in preferences ® fairly high to match import
shares observed in the data. As a benchmark calibration, I will use ® = 0:7 throughout the paper but
I also present optimal portfolios without home bias in preferences (® = 0:5) for comparison purposes.
For the US, the openness to trade, i.e the ratio of (exports+imports) over GDP is 24% in 2004. I then
evaluate the steady-state import share at 12%
14. By setting the home bias in preferences to 0:70, I match
14In 2004, imports were higher than exports but since the model is approximated around the symmetric equilibrium
where the trade balance is zero, I use
Exp+Imp
2GDP to approximate the steady-state import share.
16the observed steady-state import share in the US with an average trade cost ¿ = 35% (respectively when
® = 0:5, trade costs must be as large as 65%). However, an import share of 12% is probably an upper-
bound since a substantial part of the US imports are reexported to other markets and not consumed
in the US due to vertical specialization
15. Hummels et al. [2001] estimates this share of world trade at
around 20%. But since the trade cost parameter is free, one can easily see what happens when trade
costs are larger. Anderson and Van Wincoop [2004] estimate international trade costs in the range of
40% to 70% so the calibrations used in the paper seem fairly reasonable.
This gives the equilibrium share of domestic assets in the portfolio (¹) as a function of ¿ shown in
¯gure 1. Portfolios exhibit a foreign bias in the presence of trade frictions: at the margin, an increase
in trade costs ¿ reduces ¹ and increases the foreign bias in portfolio. This is in sharp contradiction
with Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000]. Moreover, the e®ect is rather large: in the benchmark case (® = 0:7)
increasing trade costs from 20 to 60% (or equivalently decreasing the import share by 10%) leads to an
increase in the share foreign asset holdings of 30%! Finally, by comparing the two curves of ¯gure 1, we
see that a rise in the home bias in preferences (®) for a given level of trade costs also increase the foreign
bias in portfolios: portfolio biases do not depend on whether trade barriers a®ect the extensive margin
of trade (the number of varieties traded through ®) or the intensive margin (through ¿)
16.










Figure 1: Impact of trade costs ( ¿) on holdings of domestic shares (¹). Calibration: ° = 2,
1
1¡½ = 5 and
® = 0:7 (or ® = 0:5, upper curve).
In this set-up, it is central to understand that foreign bias in portfolio is driven by the negative
covariance between domestic asset returns and the real exchange rate when goods markets are not \too
15Moreover, coming to our model, evaluating the steady-state share of imports over GDP at 12% will also bias upwards
the real openness of the US since the US do not represent half of world production.
16However, when home and foreign goods are very poor substitutes, 1=(1 ¡ ½), the two parameters a®ect portfolios
di®erently: see discussion 2.9
17closed". Empirically, Hau and Rey [2003] show that it seems to be the relevant case. Indeed, they ¯nd
that stock market booms are associated with a depreciated currency (see also Lane [2003]
17).
2.9 Comments
² Robustness check: How realistic is the case µ½ > µ
¤
½ ?
For standard preferences (° > 1 and
1
1¡½ > 1)
18, trade costs in goods markets will generate some home
bias in portfolios if and only if µ½ > µ
¤
½ ? (i.e trade costs are su±ciently high). This makes sense since
in the neighborhood of two closed economies, portfolios should be fully biased towards domestic assets.
I ask whether this condition can be veri¯ed with reasonable parameter values. Indeed, goods markets
are fairly closed in the real world. Since µ
¤
½ depends on the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods and on the coe±cient of risk-aversion, I calculate µ
¤










2 2 0:82 324% 9%
2 5 0:94 96% 3%
2 8 0:96 58% 2%
4 2 0:77 208% 11:5%
4 5 0:92 79% 4%
4 8 0:95 50% 2:5%
6 2 0:75 185% 12:5%
6 5 0:91 74% 4:5%
6 8 0:94 47% 3%
Table 2: Is µ½(¿) > µ
¤
½ ? Trade costs (¿















One can easily show that given (®;°;½), there is a unique (¿
¤) such that µ
¤
½ = µ½(¿
¤). In other words,
given preferences, there is a unique (¿
¤) such that investors do exhibit home bias in portfolios
19 when
trade costs are larger than (¿
¤). I calculate this cut-o® value of trade costs (¿
¤) for di®erent con¯guration
of the parameters keeping ® ¯xed to 0.7. I also gives the import share (
Imp
GDP )
¤ associated with this cut-o®
value of trade costs. The di®erent parameter con¯gurations are shown in table 2. Unless assuming a
17A large literature in ¯nance on exchange rate exposure of individual ¯rms also exists with mixed results: but, if
anything, on average, higher ¯rms stock returns tend to be associated with a depreciated currency in developed countries.
See Dominguez and Tesar [2004] for recent work on this issue.
18Higher relative risk-aversion (°) than one seems fairly uncontroversial. We will discuss the case of (1=(1 ¡ ½) < 1).
19Remind that for ¿=¿¤, portfolios are undetermined since home and foreign assets are perfect substitutes.
18very high relative risk aversion, a low elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (and
consequently incredibly large trade costs to match the observed import share), we ¯nd that the import
share associated with the cut-o® value of trade costs (¿
¤) is substantially lower than the observed import
share in the US (12%). The bottom-line is that, goods markets are not very open but they are not closed
enough to generate some \home bias in equities" in this model.
² Comment on Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000]
In Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000], the Arrow-Debreu allocation is simply replicated with equity shares
when ° = 1 ¡ ½. They assume ½ > 0 in their calibration, which means that ° < 1. In this case, calculus





When ° < 1, the \substitution e®ect" dominates and investors prefer assets that give higher returns
when the price of their consumption bundle is lower. According to my set-up, the \hedging demand" due
to real exchange rate °uctuations leads to home bias in equities and this bias is indeed increasing with


















What I have shown is that the home bias they replicate under this speci¯c calibration is far from
being general (especially, under more standard calibrations, one would expect ° > 1).
² The role of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
Heathcote and Perri [2002] provide short-run estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods that are slightly smaller than one
21. One could think that such a hypothesis would help
us generate home bias in portfolios in this model. When domestic prices are lower, the gain in market
share never compensates the deterioration in the terms-of-trade since consumers cannot substitute easily
domestic and foreign consumption and domestic capital returns shrink. There is an \excessive positive
transmission mechanism" and a good shock in the home country is mainly bene¯cial to the foreign country
(a case of immiserizing growth). In this case, relative domestic prices and relative capital returns are
positively correlated and domestic investors would prefer domestic assets. In particular, one can show
20One can show that in this speci¯c case \home bias in consumption" and \home bias in portfolio" are moving one for
one: the share of foreign assets in the portfolio is equal to the share of imports in total consumption.
21Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2004] and Kollmann [2006] also assume an elasticity smaller than 1. Following Tille [2001],
in a previous version of the paper, I had disentangled the elasticity of substitution between varieties within and across






















However as explained in this section, it does not really help to solve the puzzles.




° < 1, the share of foreign assets is exactly equal to the import
share. However, in this case, at the margin, an increase in trade costs ¿ reduces the equity home bias and
the consumption home bias. Higher trade costs raise imports in value since the elasticity of demand with
respect to imports is very low and people will hold more foreign assets to stabilize their purchasing power
on imports. In this case, trade costs are actually worsening both puzzles. Note that on the contrary, an
increase in the home bias in preferences ® leads to a higher home bias in consumption and higher home
bias in equities in this case
22. However, given that many empirical works in international trade usually
agree on larger elasticities of substitution across goods and put forward trade costs as one of the main
explanation of the consumption home bias, I do not consider this case as a realistic one. From now on, I
stick on the more standard case where
1
1¡½ is larger than 1.
² Unrealistic features of the complete markets model
Trade costs in goods markets obviously allow us to solve the \home bias in consumption puzzle".
But under reasonable preferences (° > 1 and
1
1¡½ > 1), trade costs in goods markets actually worsens
the \home bias in equities puzzle". This is perhaps unexpected. As often in international economics,
the resolution of one puzzle is at the expense of the others. Since the \home bias in equities" is still a
very pervasive phenomenon and that trade costs are necessary to solve the \home bias in consumption
puzzle", one should be able to set up a model with trade costs that is not inconsistent with observed
equilibrium portfolios. Moreover, empirically, portfolios are biased towards trading partners, suggesting
that an increase in trade costs reduces foreign asset holdings. Adding small frictions in international
¯nancial markets will help us to reconcile our three stylized facts. This is the main motivation of the
next section.
3 Adding frictions in ¯nancial markets
I now assume that both investors do not face the same investment opportunity set because of some
frictions in international ¯nancial markets. Adding frictions in ¯nancial markets will obviously lead to
some \home bias in equities" but the main point is that the interaction between trade costs and ¯nancial
frictions also matters for portfolio choice. I will show that a decrease in trade costs makes ¯rms' revenues
more volatile. As a consequence, for a given level of ¯nancial frictions, the diversi¯cation opportunities
provided by foreign assets increase when trade costs are reduced. Domestic investors will more likely buy
foreign assets when trade costs are low.
I introduce frictions in ¯nancial markets in a simple way: for each share of foreign assets bought,
domestic investors will have to pay a proportional tax (T) on foreign asset incomes earned in the second
22Case emphasized by Kollmann [2006]
20period (and vice-versa, foreigners have to pay the same cost on domestic asset capital incomes in order to
keep the symmetry). This asset trade cost (T) captures any frictions in international ¯nancial markets
(information cost, transaction cost, additional tax paid on foreign capital incomes
23...). The existence of
informational asymmetries or \familiarity e®ects" in ¯nancial markets is the main message of Coval and
Moskowitz [1999], Portes and Rey [2005] and Huberman [2001]. Looking at international taxation of cap-
ital incomes, Gordon and Hines [2002] ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences of ¯scal treatment between investment
in domestic assets and investment in foreign assets. In particular, withholding taxes on the repatriation
of foreign dividends (which amounts to 10 to 15% of total foreign dividend incomes in OECD countries)
have to be paid by home investors
24.
I add two more assumptions:
(i) Asset trade costs paid by foreigners are redistributed to domestic shareholders (nothing is lost in
transit)
25,
(ii) T << 1, such that Tc Ri will be negligible
26.
The main consequences of this ¯nancial friction is that agents will depart from the ¯rst-best portfolio
and risk-sharing will no longer be optimal
27. Because markets are now incomplete, I cannot use the same
resolution technique to ¯nd equilibrium portfolios and I have to solve the decentralized problem.
3.1 Goods market equilibrium under incomplete markets








2 [0;1], that is inversely related to trade costs in goods
markets: an increase in » means a deepening of trade integration.
Using demand functions in section (2.6), we get the following expressions for ¯rms revenues (and
capital incomes):
























Firms' revenues increase when:
- domestic prices are lower than foreign prices due to the gain in markets shares: this e®ect is larger
when barriers to trade are low (high ») and when international competition is tough (high ½).
- foreign and domestic aggregate incomes (c IH and c IF) are higher, since demand is higher. The presence
of trade frictions makes domestic ¯rms' revenues more sensitive to domestic incomes.
23Strictly speaking, T should be more interpreted as a di®erential of taxation or a transaction cost paid to foreign traders
rather than an information cost. Indeed, since it is redistributed, it should not be a resource cost.
24Moreover most European markets have dividend imputation schemes which takes the form of tax rebate on dividends
earned on local companies.
25I could have introduced an iceberg cost paid ex-ante when agents invest in foreign assets without changing the results:
it will just have complicated the analysis since the quantity of capital provided to the ¯rms would have been a®ected by
this cost, which in turn would have modi¯ed market-clearing conditions in the goods market.
26This allows us to abstract from the hedging demand due to stochastic redistribution.
27Technically speaking, the ratio of Lagrange-Multipliers of both budget constraints will no longer be equal to 1: ¸H 6= ¸F.
21The budget constraint in both countries is:
IH = ¹RHk + (1 ¡ ¹)RF(1 ¡ T)k + TRH(1 ¡ ¹)k
IF = ¹RFk + (1 ¡ ¹)RH(1 ¡ T)k + TRF(1 ¡ ¹)k









¹c RF + (1 ¡ ¹)d RH
´
(12)
Substituting (11) and (12) into (9) and rearranging terms:
(d RH ¡ c RF) = ¡
½
1 ¡ ½




Equation (13) tells us how gains in market share due to smaller relative prices a®ect ¯rms' revenues
in equilibrium.
Using b pi = c Ri ¡ b ai, we get the expression of ¯rms' cash-°ows in terms of relative productivity shocks:




Like in the previous section, when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is
larger than one (
1
1¡½ > 1), ·(»;¹) > 0 and home ¯rms' revenues expand relative to the foreign ¯rms'
revenues when productivity is higher in the home country.
Coming to world income, we have
29:
c IH + c IF = d RH + c RF = c aH + c aF (15)





(1 + ·(»;¹)) c aH +
1
2




(1 + ·(»;¹)) c aF +
1
2
(1 ¡ ·(»;¹)) c aH (17)
This expression tells us that part of foreign shocks to productivity are transmitted to domestic ¯rms
through relative prices adjustment. If foreign ¯rms produce more, domestic ¯rms bene¯t from higher
relative prices. A share (
1¡·
2 ) of a foreign productivity shock is transmitted to home ¯rms. The share
of the shock that is transmitted depends on the competition between home and foreign ¯rms, that will
be measured by (·): when · is high, competition is severe and there is very little risk-sharing through
terms-of-trade adjustment.
28See appendix for a proof. Note that due to the redistribution of taxes and to symmetry of countries, (T) does not
appear in the budget constraint in equilibrium.
29Remind that the world price index is used as a numeraire: b P = 1
2(c pH + c pF) = 0
223.2 Volatility of incomes and diversi¯cation gains
How do trade costs a®ect the international transmission of productivity shocks in this two-country general
equilibrium? Equations (14) to (17) allow us to answer this question: ·(»;¹) is increasing in the degree
of trade integration (») (or decreasing in the level of trade costs). As a consequence, the impact of a good
productivity shock relative to the foreign country increases capital incomes much more when trade costs
are low. This is due to the gain of market shares in international markets. When trade costs are high, at
given factor costs, a good productivity shock does not allow ¯rms to sell much more output since foreign
¯rms are sheltered from competition, as a consequence, ¯rms' cash-°ows stay roughly stable. This makes
¯rms' revenues less volatile when frictions in goods markets are high. In other words, following a good
supply shock in the home country, the fall in domestic prices necessary to absorb this additional supply is
higher when goods markets are more segmented, which stabilizes ¯rms revenues. To the contrary, when
trade costs are low, ¯rms increase their market share much more after a good shock relative to foreigners,
which makes ¯rms' market shares more volatile.
Turning to the correlation of ¯rms' revenues between countries, a fall of trade costs lowers the cor-
relation of ¯rms' revenues across countries, since expanding the market share of domestic ¯rms is at the
expense of foreign ¯rms.
Both e®ects will play in the same direction for portfolio. Since the volatility of domestic incomes
increases and the correlation of capital returns decreases when trade costs are lower, domestic investors
will more likely buy foreign assets for a given level of friction in ¯nancial markets. In other words,
when trade costs are low, there is less risk-sharing through relative price adjustment, which increases the
incentives to share risks through portfolio diversi¯cation.
3.2.1 Volatility of capital returns
Real capital returns depend on the price index that is used to de°ate capital incomes. I keep the world
price index to de°ate incomes but results regarding the volatility of returns do not depend on this choice.
I introduce ¾i the volatility of capital incomes (c Ri) in country (i). ¾ is the volatility of productivity
shocks in both countries and ´ the correlation between these shocks across countries (\fundamental
correlation").










1 + ´ + ·(»;¹)










Since under reasonable parameter values,
@·(»;¹)
@» > 0, the volatility of capital returns increases when
barriers to trade in goods fall.







When competition in international markets is more severe (higher ½ or lower trade costs), the volatility
of cash-°ows increases because there is less risk-sharing through the adjustment of relative prices.
The evidence that increasing competition from foreign markets makes ¯rms sales more volatile is
empirically consistent with Thesmar and Thoenig [2004] and Irvine and Ponti® [2005] at the ¯rm-level
and di Giovanni and Levchenko [2006] at the sectoral-level. Easterly et al. [2000] and Kose et al. [2003]
show that trade openness increases volatility of growth at the aggregate level. Janiak [2004] and Traca
[2005] document similar e®ects looking at labour incomes.
3.2.2 Diversi¯cation gains
Diversi¯cation gains are measured in terms of cov(d RH¡ c RF;d RH¡ c RF). When V ar(d RH¡ c RF) is low, small
¯nancial frictions can generate very large home bias in portfolio. Indeed, in such a case, either assets
are not very risky or highly correlated which reduces the diversi¯cation gains of holding foreign assets.
This term will show up in the derivation as a key parameter to determine the impact of the friction in
¯nancial markets on portfolio biases.
cov(d RH ¡ c RF;d RH ¡ c RF) = 2·
2 (»;¹)¾
2(1 ¡ ´)






2(1 ¡ ´) > 0






2(1 ¡ ´) > 0
Diversi¯cation gains increase with the integration in the goods markets (and with the degree of
competition). Foreign assets become more attractive under a low level of trade costs (and a high degree
of competition) for a given level of frictions (T) in ¯nancial markets. This is the main point I will make
clear when turning to equilibrium portfolios.
3.3 Equilibrium asset portfolios
I now come to the expression of optimal portfolios.
Domestic investors choose their portfolio in the following way :
- taking prices and variance/covariance structure of returns and goods prices as given.
- taking foreign investors' asset holdings as given.
The second assumption is the main reason why both investors will hold undiversi¯ed portfolios and
risk-sharing will not be optimal: the externality introduced by the tax in international ¯nancial markets
is not internalized by both agents
30.
30One can easily show that the equilibrium will be suboptimal and that a world central planner that internalizes the
externality of taxes would provide better insurance to both agents by setting the same portfolios as in the previous section.
24Given preferences and log-normal distribution of shocks, a representative investor in the home country
maximizes the following objective function with respect to ¹ subject to its budget constraint:
E( c CH) ¡
° ¡ 1
2
V ar( c CH)

















cov(d RH ¡ c RF; c PH ¡ c PF)
V ar(d RH ¡ c RF)
!
(18)
Then, asset demand of domestic assets is the sum of three terms:
- the \world market portfolio" (
1
2) due to diversi¯cation motive.
- the domestic bias due to the friction in ¯nancial markets. Note that as expected, the bias is
ampli¯ed by the term V ar(d RH ¡ c RF)
¡1 which is the inverse of the diversi¯cation gains provided by
foreign assets. This is the new channel through which trade barriers will a®ect portfolio biases. Higher
trade barriers shelter domestic ¯rms from foreign competition and stabilize ¯rms' cash-°ows. This reduces
the diversi¯cation bene¯ts of holdings foreign assets for a given ¯nancial friction (T) and leads to a larger
home bias in equities.
- the hedging of real exchange rate °uctuations. This term cancels out when utility is logarithmic
(° = 1). Like in the previous section, when ° > 1, the share of domestic assets in portfolios increases if
and only if the real exchange rate and the domestic returns (relative to the foreign ones) are positively
correlated.
3.4 Description of equilibrium portfolios
3.4.1 Without real exchange rate hedging (° = 1)
First, I suppose that investors have a logarithmic utility (° = 1) which allows us to abstract from the















Higher trade costs in goods markets reduce the needs for insurance of domestic agents. Diversi¯cation
bene¯ts are reduced, which increases the domestic equity bias for a given level of friction (T) in ¯nancial
markets. This contrasts with the results obtained in the previous section.
31See appendix. Here I assume that domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, ie V ar(d RH ¡ d RF) 6= 0,
otherwise portfolios are undetermined.
25Calibration
Preferences
Relative risk-aversion ° = 1




Volatility ¾ = 0:07
Correlation ´ = 0:3
Goods and Asset markets frictions
Home-bias in preferences ® = 0:70
Trade costs ¿ 2 [0;1]
Financial Frictions T = 10
¡3
Table 3: Parameter values
Setting the volatility and correlation of productivity shocks is not an easy task. Indeed, the volatility
of stock markets is much higher than the volatility of business cycles: in the US, business cycles volatility
is as low as 2% on annual basis, whereas stock returns volatility is as large as 15%. The volatility of
dividend growth is somewhere in between this two values, around 6-7% (see Campbell [1999]). This is the
the value of the volatility I use to calibrate the model. However, increasing (or decreasing) the volatility
of shocks does not change the results qualitatively
32. For the correlation of shocks, I use the correlation
of GDP growth between the US and the rest of the world over the period 1980-2000 (see Heathcote and
Perri [2004]). I set the level of frictions in ¯nancial markets to T = 10
¡3. The level of ¯nancial frictions is
such that for the parameter values chosen, the home bias in equities is around 30% for a degree of trade
openness of 25% (Export+Import over GDP ratio)
33.
It is important to notice that the level of ¯nancial frictions introduced to match the home in port-
folio is fairly low: indeed, counteracting terms-of-trade movements provides already a good insurance
mechanism to uncertainty in both markets (like in Cole and Obstfeld [1991], Acemoglu and Ventura
[2002], Pavlova and Rigobon [2003]) and consequently small ¯nancial frictions generate very large port-
folio biases. Contrary to frictions in goods markets, this is a second-order e®ect whose magnitude is the
covariance between domestic and foreign cash-°ows.
32In particular, it does not change the results concerning the impact of trade costs on asset portfolios as long as ¯nancial
frictions generate substantial home bias in portfolios. The main point is that under higher volatility, higher frictions in
¯nancial markets are needed to match observed portfolios
33For a volatility of shocks of 0.14, the ¯nancial friction (T) must equal 4:10¡3 to reproduce observed portfolio allocations.
Then, depending on the calibration, ¯nancial frictions (T) should be in the bracket of 10 to 40 basis points to match observed
portfolios. However, if I want to match the moments of stock returns, I also should raise the correlation of shocks since
stock returns correlation is much higher than business cycles correlation.








Figure 2: Impact of trade costs (¿) on holdings of domestic shares (¹) in presence of ¯nancial frictions.
Parameters given in table 3.
The numerical results of this calibration are shown in ¯gure 2. Decreasing trade costs from 70% to
25% corresponds to a 10% increase in the import over GDP ratio. This is associated with a 9% increase
in the share of foreign asset holdings. In this benchmark calibration, home bias in consumption and home
bias in equities almost moves one for one: a one percent increase in the import over GDP ratio leads to
an 0:9% increase of foreign asset holdings.
3.4.2 With real exchange rate hedging (° = 2)
The main criticism that can be addressed to the previous part is that the \real exchange rate hedging"
component has been ignored. If one believes that investors are more risk averse than log-investors,
one would expect this component of asset demand to play in the opposite direction. Indeed, as shown
in the previous section, when the real exchange rate appreciates, it is bad news for domestic asset
returns. Domestic investors should bias their portfolio towards foreign assets to keep their purchasing
power constant (and all the more that their consumption basket is biased towards home goods). Since
two forces are playing in opposite directions, the dependence of asset portfolios on trade costs becomes
undetermined.

















Except for the relative risk aversion and the level of ¯nancial frictions, I keep the same parameters
as before. Since a higher risk aversion makes investors more likely to have diversi¯ed portfolios, I need
to increase the level of frictions in ¯nancial markets to match observed portfolios
34. I set T = 2:10
¡3 to
34Indeed, note that in expression (18), portfolio biases depend on T=°
27keep a home bias in portfolio around 30% in the benchmark calibration (which is still reasonably low).
Figure 3 shows the share of domestic assets in equilibrium portfolios as a function of trade costs.







Figure 3: Impact of trade costs ( ¿) on holdings of domestic shares (¹) in presence of ¯nancial frictions
with ° = 2
As expected, the real exchange rate hedging component dampens the e®ect of trade costs on the
holdings of domestic assets compared to the previous case. But even in this case, an increase in trade
costs reduces the purchase of foreign assets and reinforces the home bias in portfolio. The lower demand
for insurance induced by a lower competition from foreign ¯rms dominates the hedging demand to insure
real exchange rate °uctuations.
A one percent increase in the share of imports over GDP leads to a 0:7% increase in the share of
foreign assets in the portfolio. This is very close to the elasticities found in Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004]
where we found an elasticity between 0:6 and 0:7.
3.4.3 Robustness checks with respect to (
1
1¡½)
As already said, estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods vary a lot
across studies (and across sectors). I have used a lower bound of estimates from the trade literature.
Rising the elasticity (
1
1¡½) will boost the e®ect of trade barriers on consumption and portfolio home
biases. Indeed, the impact of trade costs on consumption allocation is ampli¯ed when the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods is higher. But moreover, when home and foreign goods
are closer substitutes, competition between home and foreign ¯rms is more severe and ¯rms have more
unstable market shares: in this case, trade costs which shelters home ¯rms from the competition of foreign
ones tend to be more stabilizing for ¯rms cash-°ows. As a consequence, when trade costs increases, the
incentive to diversify abroad are much more dampened
35.
35Technically, this means that:
@cov(d RH¡d RF ;d RH¡d RF )
@¿@½ > 0











Figure 4: Impact of trade costs (¿) on holdings of domestic shares (¹) in presence of ¯nancial frictions
with ° = 2 and
1
1¡½ = 2 or 8
Using the same parameters values as in section 3.4.2 (except
1
1¡½), we get the equilibrium share of
domestic assets (¹) as a function of trade costs (¿) for two di®erent values of the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods shown in ¯gure 4.
For a low elasticity of 2, the curve is almost °at
36. For a high a elasticity of 8, the curve is much
steeper and rising trade costs from 20% to 60% (or decreasing the import share by 10%) increases the
share of domestic asset holdings by almost 30%! So qualitatively, in presence of ¯nancial frictions, we
¯nd that increasing trade costs in goods markets rises the home bias in portfolios for a wide range of




The set-up used in this paper is static. Whether the results found in both sections are still valid in a
dynamic two-country equilibrium is a meaningful question. I do not think that the overall message of
the paper will be qualitatively modi¯ed in a dynamic setting. Indeed, an increase in domestic production
will still lead to a decrease in domestic prices, making asset returns and the real exchange rate negatively
correlated in standard cases. Then, the foreign bias in portfolio to hedge real exchange rate °uctuations
will certainly show up in a dynamic model. In a dynamic asset-pricing model, Pavlova and Rigobon
[2003] show that real exchange rate and asset returns move in opposite directions following a supply
36However, this might be a bit misleading because with such a low elasticity, trade costs must be as large as 180% to
match observed import shares and for such a level of trade costs, the curve is a bit steeper but still much °atter than for
higher elasticities.
29shock. Concerning the impact of frictions in ¯nancial markets, I am also con¯dent that the volatility of
asset returns and the diversi¯cation gains provided by foreign assets will be decreasing with the level of
trade costs in a dynamic set-up
37, which would amplify the e®ect of any friction in ¯nancial markets on
portfolio composition.
4.2 Nature of the shocks
In this model, I considered only productivity shocks as a source of uncertainty. The results found would
certainly hold in presence of any supply shocks since supply shocks are accompanied by a counteracting
relative price change (and then real exchange rate change), which is the key-mechanism driving foreign
bias in portfolio in the complete markets case.
However, one might expect to reverse the results of section 2 in the presence of demand shocks. With
trade costs, a domestic demand shock a®ects domestic ¯rms more than foreign ones since demand is biased
domestically. For given supply, a domestic demand shock would drive domestic prices and domestic asset
returns up, generating a positive correlation between both variables, even more when trade costs are
high. If demand shocks are the main source of uncertainty, it could potentially generate a home bias
in portfolio that is increasing in the level of trade costs. The main question is how we should model
these demand shocks. Following Stockman and Tesar [1995] and Pavlova and Rigobon [2003], I could add
preference shocks in form of shocks to the discount factor to the previous set-up. But since these shocks
a®ect the agent preferences, they would also a®ect portfolios in a surprising way: agents will more likely
buy assets that give higher returns in the states of nature where they prefer consuming today rather than
tomorrow. The way demand shocks are introduced is certainly essential and I leave for future research
a full-°edged two-country model with endogenous portfolio choice in the presence of supply and demand
shocks.
4.3 Multi-country framework
The last caveat arises from the use of a two-country framework. In section 2, I found that portfolio biases
as a function of trade costs are non-linear: foreign bias under reasonable trade costs and home bias for
very high trade costs. I suspect that a multi-country framework would lead to a very interesting portfolio
allocation, which would in a sense extend this non-linearity: one might expect that home investors bias
their portfolio towards assets of the closest competitors of domestic ¯rms (low trade costs) since these
assets yield higher returns when domestic ¯rms are performing badly (and consequently when domestic
prices are high) and not at all towards countries whose ¯rms are not competing with the domestic ones
(very high trade costs). The proof of this conjecture is also left for future work.
37A proof of this result is available on request in the case of log-utility
305 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that trade costs in goods markets alone cannot generate any \home bias in
portfolios" under reasonable preferences. On the contrary, if trade costs are the only source of friction
in international markets, investors should bias their portfolios towards foreign assets and all the more
when trade costs are high. This a very important result which goes against some conventional wisdom
in international economics that has recently put forward trade costs as the relevant friction to solve the
\home bias in portfolio puzzle". I proposed then another explanation of the low level of diversi¯cation
of investors: a combination of small frictions between ¯nancial markets and a low degree of openness of
goods markets (high trade costs).
Indeed, I have shown that the interaction between imperfections in capital markets and trade costs
matters. The reason is that trade integration increases uncertainty by increasing competition in product
markets, and investors will then more likely have diversi¯ed portfolios. This mechanism gives a channel
through which a reduction of trade costs in goods markets enhances trade in assets and this theoretical
prediction is fully in line with observed international asset allocation. I do not think that this result
depends on the way capital market imperfections are modelled. Here, I adopt a very simple friction
by assuming some taxes on the repatriation of dividends. Whatever the friction introduced however,
portfolio biases will always be ampli¯ed when diversi¯cation bene¯ts are low and the fact that goods
market integration raises the gains of diversi¯cation by raising ¯rms sales uncertainty is certainly a robust
result. There is already some evidence of this link between trade integration and ¯rm level volatility, but
more empirical work on this issue is needed.
Moreover, in terms of economic policy, if trade integration raises uncertainty, it should be accompanied
by deeper capital market integration to provide better insurance to ¯rms and household incomes. This
might be a reason why trade and ¯nancial globalization often go together.
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356 Appendix
6.1 Relationship between Asset and Goods Trade










2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5 5,5 6
Sources: Kraay et al. [2005] and Penn-World Tables. Author's calculations.
Figure 5: Positive Relationship between log(Financial Openness) and log(Trade Openness).
Vertical Axis: Financial Openness is de¯ned as the ratio of (Claims of Domestic Residents on
Foreign capital + Claims of Foreigners on Domestic Capital) over Domestic Aggregate Wealth.
Horizontal Axis: Trade Openness is de¯ned as the ratio of (Goods Exports + Goods Imports) over
GDP.
Data on Financial Openness are from Kraay et al. [2005] for a sample of 39 countries over the period
1967-1997. Data of Trade Openness are from Penn-World Tables. Each point corresponds to a ¯ve-year
average of both variables for one country (6 observations per country). Controlling for non-linearity in
market size and for the level of development do not modify the result. Multivariate regressions available
on request.
366.2 Portfolios under complete markets using investor maximization
Using the log-normal distribution of variables (
u
u¤), we get the following deviation of utility relative to
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38where t.i.p is for terms independent on policy
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6.3 Derivation of the equilibrium with ¯nancial frictions
6.3.1 Derivation of the equilibrium
Log-linearization of the budget-constraint:
IH = ¹RHk + (1 ¡ ¹)RF(1 ¡ T)k + TRH(1 ¡ ¹)k
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Using T << 1 and neglecting second-order terms like Tb u, we get:
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Equilibrium ¯rms revenues:
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386.3.2 Porfolio choice
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where ¹F is the number of foreign shares held by foreigners: in equilibrium ¹H = ¹F = ¹ but the
domestic investor chooses its portfolio taking ¹F as given.
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